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Introduction		
	
As	a	student	of	the	late	Soviet	period	one	of	us	is	feeling	a	strong	sense	of	Déjà	vu,	then—in	
the	1980s—the	Soviet	Union	was	stymied	by	an	economic	system	incapable	of	reform	and	
its	reliance	on	oil	and	gas	exports	had	been	laid	bare	when	the	oil	price	fell.	By	the	end	of	
the	1980s	the	Soviet	economy	was	in	crisis	and	failed	attempts	to	reform	it	had	prompted	
Mikhail	Gorbachev	to	seek	a	new	relationship	with	the	West.	The	era	of	glasnost’	
(openness)	and	perestroika	(restructuring)	resulted	not	in	the	rejuvenation	of	the	economy,	
but	in	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	December	1991.	Nearly	25	years	on,	we	find	a	
Russian	economy	still	overly	dependent	on	oil	and	gas	export	revenues	and	that	has	proved	
itself	incapable	of	developing	a	more	robust	and	sustainable	economic	model.		
	
Vladimir	Putin	has	returned	for	a	third	term	and	has	stirred	up	nationalist	fervour	to	paper	
over	the	cracks	of	a	flawed	economy.	The	annexation	of	Crimea	and	support	for	separatist	
forces	in	Eastern	Ukraine	may	have	found	favour	at	home,	but	they	have	also	resulted	in	
Western	sanctions	that	have	isolated	Russia	from	global	capital	markets	and	targeted	the	
ability	of	the	oil	industry	to	explore	and	develop	new	reserves.		So	far,	President	Putin	has	
been	able	to	turn	the	sanctions	to	his	own	advantage,	blaming	them	for	the	economic	
problems	at	home.	Even	the	fall	in	the	oil	price,	starting	in	2014,	was	explained	as	US	and	
Saudi	intrigue	aimed	at	Russia.	However,	the	collapse	of	the	the	oil	price	in	2014,	and	with	it	
a	dramatic	fall	in	the	value	of	the	Rouble,	has	hit	the	Russian	population	hard	and	is	now	
forcing	the	Russian	Government	to	make	substantial	budget	cuts	to	avoid	drawing	down	on	
its	significant,	but	dwindling,	National	Wealth	Fund.	Of	course,	most	of	the	Russian	
Government’s	domestic	expenditures	are	in	Roubles	and	the	dollars	it	gets	from	taxing	
energy	exports	now	go	much	further;	even	so	many	of	the	populist	measures	promised	by	
President	Putin	in	his	election	campaign	have	been	rolled	back	or	postponed.	As	a	
consequence,	the	social	contract	between	the	electorate	and	the	ruling	elite	is	under	strain	
just	as	the	social	costs	of	a	shrinking	and	aging	population	are	increasing.	At	the	same	time,	
the	rising	tide	of	nationalism	at	home	and	a	more	aggressive	foreign	policy	abroad	is	being	
backed	by	a	modernisation	of	Russia’s	armed	forces.	Significantly,	military	expenditure	is	
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the	one	area	that	has	not	been	cut;	in	fact,	it	continues	to	grow,	and	in	2015	reached	5.5%	
of	GDP	(compared	to	the	NATO	average	of	1.5%	in	2014;	see	SIPRI,	2015).1	
	
In	the	current	geopolitical	and	economic	environment,	the	question	remains	can	Russia	
afford	to	continue	to	strengthen	its	military	capability	in	the	face	of	falling	oil	and	gas	export	
revenues,	economic	recession	and	growing	social	demands	on	the	federal	budget?	This	
essay	examines	how	the	changes	in	global	and	Russian	oil	and	gas	industry	are	affecting	
Russia’s	ability	to	undertake	the	rearmament	that	has	underpinned	its	more	muscular	role	
in	the	world.	The	essay	concludes	by	considering	two	versions	of	what	might	happen	next,	
which	we	describe	as	‘détente	revisited’	and	a	‘new	cold	war.’	
	
Russia’s	oil	and	gas	dependence	
	
Russia’s	credentials	as	a	petrostate	are	impressive.	In	2013-14	(US	EIA	2015),	it	was	the	
world’s	second	largest	oil	producer,	accounting	for	12.6%	of	total	production	and	also	the	
second	largest	exporter,	both	after	Saudi	Arabia	(explaining	the	significance	of	any	
production	agreement	involving	the	two).	It	was	also	the	second	largest	producer	of	natural	
gas,	after	the	US,	and	the	leading	natural	gas	exporter.	Europe	is	by	far	the	most	important	
consumer	of	Russia’s	energy	exports,	in	2014,	more	than	70%	of	Russia's	crude	oil	exports	
and	almost	90%	of	Russia's	natural	gas	exports	went	to	Europe	(US	EIA	2015).	However,	
following	the	completion	of	the	East-Siberian	Pacific	Ocean	(ESPO)	oil	pipeline,	Asia	is	
rapidly	growing	in	significance	as	a	market	for	Russian	oil.	Natural	gas	exports	to	Asia	are	
currently	limited	to	LNG	from	Sakhalin-2,	but	these	are	planned	to	increase	by	the	end	of	
the	decade	when	the	Power	of	Siberia	pipeline	should	start	to	deliver	natural	gas	to	China.	
		
In	the	early	1990s	Russian	oil	production	plummeted	as	the	economy	collapsed	(Figure	1).	
However,	when	things	recovered	it	was	relatively	easy	to	ramp	up	production	based	on	the	
legacy	fields	from	the	Soviet	period.	After	that,	a	combination	of	investment	in	western	
technology	to	enhance	production	from	brownfields	and	the	development	in	new	fields	
sustained	production	growth.	Over	the	last	decade	the	relative	stability	of	Russian	
production—averaging	10.3	million	barrels	per	day	(Mb/d)	between	2005	and	2014—has	
resulted	in	an	‘exportable	surplus’	of	around	the	7	Mb/d	level	(EIA	2015,	3).	Alongside	the	
development	of	light	tight	oil	deposits	in	the	US,	this	production	played	a	major	role	in	
ensuring	security	of	global	supply	despite	the	turmoil	in	other	oil	exporting	nations.		
	
																																																						
1	Military	expenditure	data	for	Russia	from	Cooper	(2016).	The	methodology	employed	to	
calculate	military	expenditure	is	the	same	as	that	employed	by	SIPRI.	For	details,	see:	
Stockholm	International	Peace	Research	Institute	(SIPRI),	Recent	Trends	in	Military	
Expenditure,	Stockholm:	SIPRI			
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/copy_of_faqs#back-to-top	,	accessed	
February	16	2016.			
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Figure	1:	Russian	oil	production	1985-2014	(Thousand	Barrels	a	day)	
Source:	BP	(2015)	
	
Dependence	and	volatility	
	
Notwithstanding	the	interruptions	in	Ukrainian	gas	transit	in	2006	and	2009,	Russia	
(Gazprom)	has	also	been	a	reliable	supplier	of	a	substantial	volumes	of	natural	gas	to	
Europe,	and	exports	have	continued	uninterrupted	despite	the	crisis	in	Ukraine	and	the	
imposition	of	Western	sanctions.	In	fact,	having	fallen	from	a	post-Soviet	peak	in	2005-06,	
last	year	Russian	gas	exports	outside	the	former	Soviet	Union	(i.e.	Europe,	including	Turkey)	
increased	reaching	158.6	bcm,	82%	of	which	went	to	Western	European	countries.2	In	2013,	
according	to	the	European	Commission	(2016),	65%	of	the	EU’s	gas	was	imported,	with	30%	
of	the	EU’s	total	gas	consumption		and	39%	of	total	EU	gas	imports	coming	from	Russia.	
	
Just	as	Russia	is	a	major	player	on	global	energy	markets	and	a	source	of	energy	(in)security	
for	Europe,	so	it	is	the	case	that	the	revenue	generated	by	oil	and	gas	exports	is	essential	to	
the	Russian	economy.	Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Medvedev	(2015,	1)	made	clear	the	centrally	
of	the	energy	sector	to	Russia’s	economic	fortunes	when	he	stated:	“The	fuel	and	energy	
complex	accounts	for	over	a	quarter	of	gross	domestic	product,	almost	30	percent	of	the	
national	budget,	more	than	two-thirds	of	export	revenue	and	a	quarter	of	total	
investments.”		Figure	2	charts	the	dynamics	of	Russian	oil	and	gas	revenue	since	2000.	
																																																						
2	http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/.	These	numbers	include	all	trading	activity	by	
GazpromExport	and	include	deliveries	of	some	non-Russian	gas.	
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When	Vladimir	Putin	came	to	power	in	2000	the	average	oil	price	(for	Brent)	was	$28.50	(BP	
2015,	15).	The	chart	makes	clear	the	dominance	of	crude	oil	exports	and	the	rising	role	of	oil	
products	exports.	Natural	gas	exports	are	lower	in	both	volume	and	value—though	they	are	
also	oil	indexed—and	the	level	of	taxation	is	also	lower.	Research	by	Clifford	Gaddy	and	
Barry	Ickes	(2005)	has	investigated	Russia’s	continued	addition	to	resource	rents	and	has	
highlighted	how	the	volatility	attached	to	this	dependence	is	a	constant	source	of	economic	
instability	and	an	essential	characteristic	of	its	political	economy.		
	
	
	
Figure	2:	Dollar	Earnings	from	Russian	oil	and	gas	exports	2000-20153	
(Source:	Central	Bank	of	Russia	2016)		
	
Russia—and	its	President—rode	a	wave	of	prosperity	as	the	oil	price	increased	up	to	2008,	
but	Russia	was	hit	hardest	among	the	G20	states	by	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	as	the	oil	
price	plummeted.	The	price	rebounded	without	Russia	having	to	exhaust	its	strategic	
reserves	or	make	significant	economic	reforms.	Despite	the	rhetoric	of	modernisation	and	
diversification,	Russia’s	resource	dependence	remained.		
	
Russia	faces	of	perfect	storm		
The	current	crisis	is	more	complex	and	is	a	perfect	storm	of	collapsing	oil	and	gas	prices,	a	
crash	in	the	value	of	the	rouble	and	the	impact	of	Western	sanctions.	Over	the	first	half	of	
2014	the	average	price	for	a	barrel	of	Urals	crude	oil	was	$107,	in	the	first	half	of	2015	it	
was	$57	a	barrel	(World	Bank	2015,	16).	The	oil	price	continued	to	fall	in	the	second	half	of	
2015	and	was	below	$30	in	early	2016.		The	Russian	Government	chose	to	stop	defending	
																																																						
3	The	full	2015	statistics	are	not	available	yet	and	we	have	extrapolated	the	fall	between	
third	quarter	2014	and	third	quarter	2015	to	arrive	at	an	estimate	for	2015.	While	the	
precise	numbers	may	not	be	correct,	the	direction	of	travel	is.	The	original	values	have	been	
deflated	and	are	in	2015	US	dollars.	
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the	rouble	and	since	early	2014	it	has	lost	60%	of	its	value	against	the	dollar.	Rouble	
devaluation	is	particularly	challenging	for	individuals	and	companies	who	purchase	
imported	goods	and	services	and/or	have	debts	in	foreign	currency.	On	both	accounts,	this	
includes	Russia’s	oil	companies.	According	to	Rosstat’s	preliminary	estimates,	Russia’s	GDP	
declined	by	3.7%	in	2015	(World	Bank	2016).	Yet	despite	the	domestic	economic	turmoil	
and	the	collapse	in	the	price	oil,	Russian	oil	production	actually	increased	in	2015.	But,	as	
Figure	2	makes	clear,	the	fall	in	the	price	of	oil	and	gas	has	resulted	in	a	dramatic	fall	in	
export	revenue.	A	comparison	of	export	earnings	to	the	third	quarter	of	2015	to	the	same	
period	in	2014	shows	that	the	value	of	oil	exports	fell	by	42.7%,	oil	products	39.9%	and	
natural	gas	28.7%	(Central	Bank	of	Russia	2016).	
	
Oil	and	gas	is	a	long-term	business	and	the	current	resilience	of	Russian	oil	production	
reflects	investment	in	enhanced	recovery	and	in	new	field	development	when	the	oil	price	
was	over	$100	a	barrel.	At	the	same	time,	Russia’s	oil	and	gas	exports	generate	revenue	in	
US	dollars,	while	most	domestic	costs	are	in	Russian	Roubles.	Thus,	each	dollar	earned	from	
a	barrel	exported	is	worth	a	lot	more	Roubles	than	it	was	two	years	ago.	That	said,	the	
industry	is	still	dependent	on	foreign	oilfield	services	and	equipment	that	are	now	costlier.	
But,	as	Henderson	and	Fattouh	(2016,	5)	have	explained:	“the	tax	system	in	Russia	provided	
significant	protection	to	Russian	oil	companies,	because	the	high	level	of	the	marginal	tax	
rate	above	$25	per	barrel	has	meant	that	the	government	has	taken	most	of	the	cost	of	the	
falling	oil	price.”		
	
A	further	consideration	is	that	the	majority	of	Russia’s	production	is	in	West	Siberia	and	
there	are	technical	reasons	that	make	it	inadvisable	to	stop	production.	Finally,	some	
Russian	oil	companies	are	heavily	indebted	and	need	to	generate	foreign	currency	whatever	
the	oil	price	to	service	those	debts.	All	of	this	means	that	Russia’s	oil	companies	are	
incentivised	to	continue	produce	even	at	very	low	oil	prices.	Gas	exports	are	a	different	
matter	as	they	are	tied	to	long-term	oil-indexed	contracts	and	the	price	has	fallen	behind	
that	of	the	oil	price.	However,	current	prices	are	still	below	the	marginal	cost	of	supply	for	
Gazprom,	but	there	is	speculation	that	it	could	be	drawn	into	a	price	war	to	fend	off	
increased	LNG	exports	into	Europe	(Henderson	2016).		
	
When	Russian	annexed	Crimea	and	became	embroiled	in	conflict	in	Eastern	Ukraine,	
Western	countries	imposed	sanctions	on	Russia,	contributing	the	third	element	of	the	
perfect	storm.	Here	we	are	concerned	with	the	impact	of	sanctions	on	Russia’s	oil	and	gas	
industries.		
	
The	first	thing	to	make	clear	is	that	the	sanctions	are	not	targeted	at	reducing	Russia’s	short-
term	ability	to	export	oil	and	gas.	This	would	have	been	counterproductive	as	it	would	have	
raised	concerns	about	energy	security	in	Europe.	Rather	the	technology	sanctions	have	
targeted	key	areas	that	are	important	for	developing	new	oil	production	in	frontier	
regions—the	Arctic	and	deep-water	offshore—and	shale	projects.	The	sanctions	have	
effectively	stopped	cooperation	between	the	international	oil	companies	and	Gazprom	and	
Rosneft.		
	
The	second	element	of	financial	sanctions	is	targeted	at	specific	companies	and	individuals,	
but	the	caution	of	international	financial	institutions	is	such	that	all	Russian	companies	now	
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find	it	difficult	and	costly	to	raise	capital	on	international	financial	markets,	as	well	as	
reschedule	existing	debts.	This	is	beginning	to	have	an	impact	on	the	oil	and	gas	industry	as	
Russian	companies	are	seeing	their	own	cash	flows	shrink—particularly	when	calculated	in	
dollars-and	are	also	finding	it	difficult	to	borrow	to	finance	new	developments	(Mitrova	
2016).	This	is	a	problem	that	is	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	‘new’	oil	Russian	oil	production	
is	proving	to	be	increasingly	costly	as	it	moves	in	to	the	remote	regions	of	East	Siberia	and	
also	has	to	confront	more	complex	geology	(Gustafson	2012).		Even	the	Russian	
Government	is	now	concerned	that	in	the	next	year	or	so	Russian	oil	production	will	start	to	
decline	as	investment	dries	up;	particularly	if	the	oil	price	remains	lower	for	longer	
(Mazneva	2016).		
	
Thus,	these	short-	to	medium-term	constraints	could	run	up	against	the	impact	of	
technology	sanctions	to	reduce	Russian	oil	production	by	the	early	2020s.	This	is	not	a	view	
held	by	BP	(2016),	whose	latest	Energy	Outlook	predicts	that	Russian	oil	production	will	
remain	stable	at	about	11	MB/pd	through	2035	and	gas	production	will	expand	by	30%	by	
2035.	But,	as	the	current	situation	highlights,	for	the	Russian	Government	it	is	more	about	
value	than	volume.		
	
The	Russian	economy	is	not	about	to	collapse,	but	these	are	undoubtedly	challenging	times	
for	President	Putin.	If	the	oil	price	remains	lower	for	longer	and	Western	sanctions	remain	
in	place,	Russian	oil	production	may	soon	start	to	decline,	further	eroding	the	Government’s	
tax	base.	Thus,	when	President	Putin	goes	to	the	polls	in	2018	he	could	face	a	hostile	
electorate	that	may	question	his	costly	rearmament	programme	in	the	face	of	rising	social	
needs	and	declining	living	standards.	
	
The	Return	of	the	Military	Industrial	Complex		
	
The	boom	in	the	value	of	hydrocarbon	exports	described	above	laid	the	foundations	for	the	
return	of	the	defence-industrial	complex	(oboronnyi-promyshlennyi	kompleks,	or	OPK)	to	a	
leading	role	in	the	Russian	economy.	In	2010,	Russia	began	a	decade-long	military	
procurement	programme	that	is	intended	to	both	equip	Russia’s	armed	forces	with	modern	
equipment,	and	to	modernise	the	defence-industrial	base,	so	that	Russia	can	produce	
modern	weapon	systems	well	into	the	future.	But	government	plans	for	the	OPK	are	even	
grander	than	the	re-equipment	of	the	armed	forces.	In	2012,	President	Putin	expressed	the	
hope	that	this	rearmament	programme	would	not	only	result	in	a	more	effective	military	
machine,	but	also	that	a	defence-industrial	renaissance	would	act	as	a	“driver	of	
modernisation”	across	the	wider	Russian	economy	(Putin	2012a,	2012b).		
	
Alongside	the	buoyant	hydrocarbons	sector,	a	reinvigorated	OPK	has	underpinned	Russia’s	
growing	assertiveness	in	international	affairs	(Cooper,	2015).	Indeed,	the	political	
importance	attached	to	rebuilding	the	defence-industrial	base	cannot	be	underestimated:	it	
was,	after	all,	the	resistance	of	Aleksei	Kudrin	to	the	funding	the	rearmament	programme	
that	resulted	in	the	highly	regarded	former	Finance	Minister	and	long-time	confidant	of	
Vladimir	Putin	resigning	from	government	in	2011	(Nikol’skii,	2011).	
	
The	precise	nature	of	the	expansion	in	defence	procurement	is	laid	out	in	the	State	
Armaments	Programme	2011-2020	(gosudarstvennaya	programma	vooruzheniya,	or	GPV-
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2020).	The	GPV-2020	is	a	10-year	programme	that	envisages	the	large-scale	procurement	of	
a	wide	range	of	weapon	systems.4	It	is	hoped	that	70%	of	the	armed	forces’	equipment	will	
be	modern	when	the	GPV	is	completed.5		This	lofty	objective	followed	years	of	neglect	and	
underfunding	after	the	disintegration	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1991.	This	neglect	was	made	
more	acute	by	the	fact	that	the	OPK	was	one	of	the		-	if	not	the	–	highest	priority	sectors	in	
the	Soviet	economy.	It	enjoyed	preferential	access	to	resources	–	financial,	physical	and	
human	-	and	was	politically	powerful	(Gaddy,	1996;	Cooper,	2013a).	However,	the	OPK	saw	
its	elevated	status	diminish	over	the	course	of	the	1990s	as	savage	spending	cuts	and	
economic	reforms	starved	the	OPK	of	much	of	its	funding.	As	government	funding	collapsed	
over	the	1990s,	the	OPK	shrank	dramatically,	with	only	arms	exports	to	the	likes	of	China	
and	India	keeping	many	enterprises	afloat	(Cooper,	2013a).	
		
After	the	poor	performance	of	the	Russian	armed	forces	during	the	brief	conflict	with	
Georgia	in	2008,	the	OPK	was	boosted	by	the	government’s	commitment	to	expand	
procurement	spending	under	the	rearmament	programme.		A	total	of	RUB	20.7	trillion	(or	c.	
USD	640	billion	at	the	average	2011	exchange	rate)	was	allocated	to	fund	the	procurement	
of	modern	equipment,	as	well	as	the	development	of	future	weapon	systems	(Falichev,	
2011).6	While	progress	in	some	areas	has	not	been	as	fast	as	originally	planned	(e.g.	there	
have	been	delays	to	the	development	of	the	high	profile	T-50	PAK-FA	fifth	generation	
fighter	aircraft	and	the	Armata	main	battle	tank),	the	rearmament	programme	has	so	far	
resulted	in	the	delivery	of	a	wide	range	of	modern	weapon	systems	that	have	contributed	to	
a	significant	upgrading	of	Russian	military	capabilities.7		
	
The	new	leading	sector	of	the	Russian	economy?	
	
As	well	as	enhancing	Russian	military	capabilities,	the	role	of	the	OPK	in	the	wider	Russian	
economy	has	grown	substantially	since	2011.	Total	Russian	military	expenditure	grew	from	
3.8%	in	2010	to	5.5%	in	2015.8	This	figure,	of	course,	includes	military	expenditure	beyond	
procurement,	such	as	expenditure	on	military	wages,	pensions,	housing,	training	and	
exercises,	and	operational	expenditure.	But	the	share	of	defence	procurement	rose	
																																																						
4	Though	spending	is	back-loaded,	so	that	one	third	is	scheduled	to	place	before	2016,	with	
two-thirds	thereafter	(Barabanov	et	al,	2013).	
5	As	well	as	new	or	recently	developed	weapon	systems,	this	includes	‘modernised’	
equipment	from	the	Soviet	era.	For	example,	modernized	MiG-31	fighter	and	Tu-160	
strategic	bomber	aircraft	were	all	developed	during	the	1980s,	while	the	Tu-22	and	Tu-95	
aircraft	were	development	even	earlier.						
6	According	to	BOFIT,	the	average	dollar-RUB	exchange	rate	in	2011	was	32.2	RUB	per	$.	
See:	http://www.suomenpankki.fi/bofit_en/seuranta/venajatilastot/Pages/default.aspxGPV	
2020.	In	an	interview,	the	then-First	Deputy	Defence	Minister,	Alexander	Sukhorukov,	
	described	the	funding	mechanisms	for	the	GPV-2020	(Falichev,	2011).	
7	It	should	also	be	noted	that	many	weaknesses	remain.	It	is	therefore	important	not	to	
exaggerate	the	impact	of	Russia’s	military	modernization	programme	(Renz,	2014).			
8	The	share	of	GDP	devoted	to	military	expenditure	is	higher	than	for	any	NATO	country,	as	
well	as	China,	India	and	Japan	(SIPRI,	2015).	
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especially	sharply,	rising	from	1%	of	GDP	in	2010	to	over	2.3%	of	GDP	in	2015.9	This	has	
caused	a	reorientation	of	government	spending.	In	2010,	military	expenditure	as	a	share	of	
total	federal	government	spending	was	15.9%;	by	2015	it	had	risen	to	25.8%.10		
	
It	is	therefore	clear	that	the	renewed	emphasis	on	the	defence	industry	in	Russia	has	caused	
the	role	of	the	OPK	in	the	Russian	economy	to	strengthen	considerably.		This	is	not	suggest	
that	Russia	is	anywhere	close	to	the	Soviet	Union’s	level	of	militarisation,	where	military	
expenditure	accounted	for	anywhere	between	15-20%	of	GDP	in	the	1980s	(Gaddy,	1996;	
Cooper,	2013).	Clearly	it	is	not.	Nevertheless,	there	is	evidence	of	a	creeping	yet	discernible	
reorientation	towards	military	production	that	may	become	more	pronounced	should	the	
geopolitical	environment	not	improve.	Indeed,	should	Russia	maintain	what	Clifford	Gaddy	
and	Michael	O’Hanlon	refer	to	as	a	‘Reaganov’	posture	–	i.e.	a	policy	mix	that	emphasises	a	
strong	military,	a	confident	and	assertive	foreign	policy,	and	an	economic	policy	that	focuses	
on	scientific	achievement	in	strategic	sectors	–	in	the	near	future,	it	is	likely	that	the	OPK	will	
enjoy	an	elevated	status	in	Russia’s	political	economy	in	the	years	to	come	(Gaddy	and	
O’Hanlon,	2015).	
	
Sanctions	and	the	fall	of	the	oil	price		
	
Russia’s	ambitious	plans	to	re-equip	its	military	may,	however,	be	derailed	by	the	sharp	
decline	in	global	oil	prices,	as	well	as	by	the	changing	structure	of	Russian	oil	production	
described	in	the	first	section	of	this	article.	This	is	because	the	decline	in	oil	prices	has	
exacerbated	a	pre-existing	slowdown	in	economic	growth.	This	slowdown	has	been	evident	
since	2012,	and	was	likely	caused	by	the	exhaustion	of	the	economic	growth	model	that	
served	Russia	well	between	1999	and	2008.11	After	annual	economic	growth	had	averaged	
over	7%	between	1999	and	2009,	growth	slowed	considerably.	In	2014,	annual	real	GDP	
growth	slowed	to	just	0.6%,	down	from	1.3%	in	2013,	and	around	4%	in	2012.	This	
slowdown	was	likely	caused	by	a	combination	of	many	factors,	including	a	shrinking	labour	
force,	the	slowdown	in	growth	of	government	and	consumer	spending	and,	perhaps	most	
importantly,	a	low	and	declining	share	of	investment	in	economic	activity	(Connolly,	2011;	
Gaddy	and	Ickes,	2014).	Thus,	when	oil	prices	plummeted,	an	economy	buffeted	by	the	
combination	of	Western	sanctions	and	a	home-grown	structural	slowdown,	plunged	into	
recession,	with	GDP	estimated	to	have	contracted	by	3.7%	in	2015.		
	
The	deep	and	so-far	protracted	recession	has	imposed	constraints	on	federal	government	
spending.	The	share	of	funds	allocated	to	support	health	and	education	has	declined	in	
recent	years	as	the	share	allocated	to	defence	rose.	Facing	a	severe	recession	in	2015,	the	
Russian	government	was	forced	to	cut	spending	as	tax	revenues	dwindled.	While	some	
areas	of	government	spending	were	cut	by	over	15%,	the	allocated	funds	for	‘national	
defence’	were	cut	by	just	4.8%	per	cent	(Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation,	
																																																						
9	This	includes	both	money	spent	on	the	state	defence	order	(GOZ),	and	state	guaranteed	
credits	(SGCs)	provided	to	weapons	manufacturers	(Cooper,	2016).	
10	Data	for	2015	taken	from	Cooper	(2016).	Data	for	2010	from	Cooper	(2013b,	p.63).			
11	Essentially,	this	model	was	based	on	the	redistribution	of	fast-growing	natural	resource	
revenues	to	other	parts	of	the	economy.	The	causes	of	this	slowdown	are	discussed	in	
Zamaraev	et	al	(2013),	Mau	(2013,	2014)	and	Kudrin	and	Gurvich	(2015).	
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2015).	Tellingly,	the	funds	allocated	to	rearmament	were	not	reduced,	with	cuts	made	
instead	to	other	areas	of	military	spending.	Even	as	the	economy	continued	to	shrink	in	
2016,	funding	for	rearmament	has	still	been	shielded	from	cuts.	While	the	budget	for	2016	
stated	that	the	direct	government	funding	allocated	to	rearmament	would	be	slashed	by	
10%	(over	180	billion	RUB,	or	$2.3bn	at	current	exchange	rates),	state-backed	loans	of	
roughly	the	same	amount	were	made	available	to	support	rearmament,	ensuring	that	the	
real	level	of	funding	remains	the	same.					
	
The	Russian	government’s	reluctance	to	cut	spending	on	rearmament,	even	in	the	face	of	a	
long	and	serious	recession,	shows	the	political	importance	attached	to	rebuilding	Russia’s	
military	capabilities.	With	the	Russian	military	a	key	component	of	a	more	muscular	foreign	
policy,	this	is	unlikely	to	end	soon,	even	as	the	wider	economy	suffers.	Even	if	cuts	are	
finally	made	to	the	rearmament	programme,	it	is	likely	that	they	will	fall	on	areas	where	
Russian	industry	has	struggled	to	make	progress.	For	example,	the	breakdown	in	relations	
with	Ukraine	has	severed	what	were	close	defence-industrial	ties	between	the	two	
countries.	This	has	caused	severe	delays	in	Russia’s	naval	procurement	programme	because	
Russia	cannot	yet	produce	the	power	units	used	in	major	surface	ships	that	it	previously	
sourced	from	Ukraine.	This	means	that	any	cuts	could	well	affect	an	area	where	planned	
procurement	might	simply	not	be	possible	anyway.	Other	projects	that	may	suffer	delays	
include	plans	to	produce	a	new	generation	of	fighter	and	strategic	bomber	aircraft.		
	
But	even	if	some	aspects	of	rearmament	make	slower	progress	than	originally	intended,	the	
infusion	of	extra	hydrocarbon	revenues	into	the	defence	industry	has	already	ensured	that	
Russia’s	armed	forces	are	significantly	more	capable	than	they	had	been	in	the	past	two	
decades.	In	the	last	five	years,	Russia	has	taken	delivery	of	new	nuclear-powered	
submarines,	dozens	of	nuclear-tipped	strategic	missiles,	and	hundreds	of	modern	fighter	
aircraft,	helicopters,	and	armoured	vehicles.	Even	though	rearmament	has	not	enjoyed	
entirely	smooth	progress,	if	continued,	it	is	likely	to	furnish	Russia	with	among	the	most	
numerous	and	sophisticated	military	forces	in	the	world.		
				
To	sum	up:	even	with	an	impaired	economy	hobbled	by	tumbling	hydrocarbon	prices,	the	
Russian	government	appears	determined	to	upgrade	its	military	capabilities.	This	could	
further	distort	an	economic	structure	that	is	becoming	increasingly	subordinated	to	serving	
the	Russian	government’s	security	and	foreign	policy	objectives	(Connolly,	2016;	Monaghan,	
2016).	This	may	well	reduce	the	rate	of	economic	growth	in	Russia	and	cause	living	
standards	to	stagnate.	But	it	will	certainly	make	Russia	a	much	more	capable	military	actor,	
and	one	that	other	countries	will	need	to	learn	to	deal	with.		
	
Back	to	the	future:	what	happens	next?		
	
It	is	clear	that	developments	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry	–	both	at	the	global	level	and	in	
Russia	–	are	imposing	financial	constraints	on	the	Kremlin	and	are	likely	to	continue	to	do	so	
in	the	near	term.	While	it	is	evident	that	the	Russian	leadership	continues	to	assign	a	great	
deal	of	importance	to	enhancing	its	military	capabilities	–and	has	done	so	since	well	before	
the	crisis	in	Ukraine	-	it	is	equally	clear	that	tough	choices	need	to	be	made	if	this	
revitalisation	of	those	capabilities	is	to	continue	at	its	current	pace.	Quite	simply,	in	
conditions	of	increasing	scarcity,	maintaining	current	levels	of	military	spending	will	lead	to	
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further	cuts	to	other	areas	of	spending,	such	as	health,	education	and	infrastructure.	This	
threatens	Russia’s	longer-term	socio-economic	development	and	with	it	President	Putin’s	
social	contract	with	the	electorate.		
	
We	are	at	a	crossroads.	The	geopolitical	situation	facing	Russia,	as	perceived	in	Moscow	
(and	not	in	Western	eyes),	will	be	crucial	to	shaping	which	direction	Russia	chooses	to	take.	
If,	on	the	one	hand,	the	Kremlin	perceives	Russia	to	be	facing	a	threatening	‘arc	of	crisis’,	it	
is	likely	they	will	continue	to	place	greater	emphasis	on	mobilising	domestic	resources	–	
political,	economic	and	cultural	-	to	prevail	in	geopolitical	conflict.	Under	these	conditions,	
military	expenditure	is	unlikely	to	fall.	While	a	‘more	guns,	less	butter’	strategy	would	
certainly	carry	significant	risks,	not	least	that	of	alienating	a	materially	worse-off	population,	
Russian	actions	to	date	suggest	this	is	a	plausible	future.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	view	
from	Moscow	is	of	a	more	benign	international	environment	–	at	least	from	the	Western	
direction	-	it	is	possible	that	policy-makers	there	will	pursue	a	less	radical	course	of	action.						
	
It	is	in	this	sense	that	the	West	has	an	important	choice	to	make.	It	could	choose	to	respond	
in	kind	to	Russian	remilitarisation	by	enhancing	its	own	military	capabilities	in	the	NATO	
theatre.	This	might	involve	a	mix	of	changes	to	military	posture,	deployment	of	forces	and	
expenditure	on	forces	in	the	region.		In	geopolitical	terms	(although	not	ideological),	this	
scenario	might	be	called	a	‘New	Cold	War’.	However,	this	might	produce	the	very	thing	the	
West	wishes	to	avoid:	a	pricklier	and	well-armed	neighbour	that	perceives	a	rising	threat	
from	its	Western	borders.	This	could	prove	costly	for	both	protagonists.	It	would	be	costly	
from	an	economic	point	of	view	(Europe’s	economies	are	not	performing	much	better	than	
Russia’s),	and	would	also	drastically	increase	the	probability	of	conflict	between	NATO	and	
Russia.		
	
A	smarter	response	would	be	to	alleviate	Russia’s	heightened	sense	of	insecurity	and	
prevent	a	return	to	a	more	adversarial	relationship	of	the	type	that	prevailed	in	the	Cold	
War.	In	this	scenario,	greater	engagement	based	on	the	recognition	of	mutual	interests	
might	prevent	both	sides	from	embarking	on	programmes	that	enhance	military	capabilities	
in	Europe	yet	raise	the	perception	of	insecurity	on	both	sides.	This	scenario	might	be	called	
‘new	Détente’	and	would	involve	Western	policy-makers	working	to	persuade	their	Russian	
counterparts	that	that	remilitarisation	will	only	weaken	Russia	further,	and	that	
reintegration	with	Western	political	and	economic	structures	best	serves	Russia’s	interests.		
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